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Resistance to Genocidal Governments:
Should Private Actors Break Laws to Protect Civilians from Mass Atrocity?
by Chad J. Hazlett*

O

ne month into the 1994 Rwandan genocide, U.S.
President Bill Clinton’s National Security Advisors
considered options to jam, destroy, or counter Radio
Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), the radio station
used by Hutu extremists to incite and direct machete-wielding
mobs. The administration ultimately decided not to take any
action against RTLM. The primary reason — doing so would
violate international communications law.1
Now suppose that where the U.S. government declined
to act, a wealthy individual hired private contractors to jam
RTLM’s transmissions, in violation of communications law and
other laws. Such an action may arguably be legal, perhaps on the
grounds that the jus cogens norm prohibiting genocide supersedes international communications law.2 It is possible that no
legal action would have been taken against the actor involved.3
For private donors and contractors, however, taking this action
in real time would have required a decision to willfully break
laws and take aggressive, invasive action normally thought to
be the sole right of states.
This article explores the conditions under which private
actors — individuals or organizations acting without government authority — are justified in breaking the law to protect
civilians from mass atrocity. Such actions could range from
training civilians to evade danger to destroying or disabling
equipment, to hiring “mercenaries” to use deadly force. The
article posits that while states should remain the “protectors of
choice,” there are cases where laws that would prevent private
actors from protecting civilians are unjust and can be broken
with caution. The article also proposes a set of “just-case criteria” drawn from civil disobedience theory and the Responsibility
to Protect, offered as a starting point to determine when such
actions are justified.

such guidance for acting when governments fail to. According
to the R2P doctrine, when sovereign governments fail to uphold
their duty to protect civilians, that responsibility falls to other
nations, preferably under authority of the United Nations (UN).
Where the intervention must occur without consent of the host
government, R2P suggests that states have the right (indeed,
responsibility) to intervene so long as 1) the situation is dire
enough; 2) non-military options have been exhausted; and 3) the
intervener has the proper intent, uses proportional means, and
has reasonable prospects of success.4

“Now suppose
that where the U.S.
government declined to
act [to end genocidal radio
broadcasts], a wealthy
individual hired private
contractors to jam . . .
transmissions, in violation
of communications laws.”

Civil Disobedience and a Private Role in the
Responsibility to Protect
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, and the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)
address the need for governments to take otherwise illegal measures to halt the worst crimes. Private actors, however, have no

Presumably states have become the subject of international
norms and laws regarding intervention against mass atrocities
because they are most capable of marshalling the resources,
engaging in diplomacy, levying sanctions or offering incentives, coordinating amongst each other, and acting as guarantors
of settlements. But when the state-based chain of responsibility proposed by R2P or called for by other instrument fails to
protect civilians from atrocities, what role should private actors
have in taking up this responsibility?
Unfortunately, no parallel to R2P (or the Genocide
Convention, or Chapter VII of the UN Charter) exists to guide
the actions of private individuals who endeavor to protect
civilians when states fail. The absence of regulations for such

* Chad J. Hazlett is Director of Protection at the Genocide Interven
tion Network, a non-profit organization working to build a domestic
constituency for the Responsibility to Protect while providing means
by which private individuals can directly support protection activities
on the ground in areas of ongoing or potential genocide and mass
atrocity.
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as rare exceptions for which there is no legal framework.6 The existence of these precedents is not necessarily sufficient to argue that such actions are justified,
but is helpful in framing the types of actions that have
occasionally been employed.
Large-scale covert or non-consensual aid operations have been conducted in Afghanistan, El Salvador,
South Africa, Ethiopia (for Tigray and Eritrea), Iraq,
Kosovo, Burma, North Korea, and Sudan, as well
as in Guatemala and Cambodia.7 While this is not
“protection” aimed at halting atrocities, such actions
do help to keep alive those affected by mass atrocities. For example, in Biafra, the Nigerian government
used starvation as an indiscriminate weapon against a
secessionist rebel movement and its civilian base. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
which normally operates only with consent, joined with
non-governmental organizations and donors to fly 5,314
(illegal) missions in privately rented planes dropping food into
the besieged area.8
Illegal activities have also been used to help people escape
from imminent harm. Oftentimes, these have been conducted by
individuals, using guile and trickery, sometimes acting with the
support of private and government donors. For example, during
the Holocaust, private actors frequently created false documents
and bribed Nazi officials to secure the release of their victims.9
Raoul Wallenberg saved as many as 100,000 Jews from Nazi
extermination by “deception, bribery, blackmail, bogus documents, false front safe houses, and more.”10 Chiune Sugihara, a
Japanese diplomat in Shanghai, issued illegal transit visas that
saved the lives of some 10,000 Jews.11 Covert aid and protection
activities continue today, in Burma where medical assistance
is provided across the Thai border, and in North Korea where
a large networks of organizations and individuals have helped
thousands of civilians escape through an underground railroad
that includes at least nine other countries.12

Children who fled the fighting in Rwanda rest in Ndosha camp in Goma.

actions is not a positive indication of international consensus
that individuals cannot participate in such actions. Indeed,
private actors have important attributes such as fewer political
constraints, flexibility and agility in making decisions, and the
ability to deny having national interests. Moreover, where states
fail to take sufficient actions — as with the Rwanda RTLM
case — private actors may be a victim’s only remaining source
of protection.
In cases where private actors can help protect civilians
without violating any laws, there is nothing to prohibit them
from doing so. The question then is what to do in cases where a
private actor would have to violate laws to protect civilians. The
bodies of international law cited above discuss the permissibility
of or the duty to violate such laws to protect civilians but only
with respect to state actors; however, the cornerstones of these
laws — the “right to life” and the prohibition of genocide —
do not lose their significance when private actors uphold them
rather than states.
Beyond international law, another useful framework in
analyzing this problem is civil disobedience. Henry David
Thoreau’s essay Civil Disobedience advocates breaking laws
that are supportive of unjust policies.5 Is it also appropriate
for private actors to selectively pose “resistance to genocidal
governments” by taking actions to protect civilian targets, even
when doing so requires breaking laws? This article does not
attempt to prove that private citizens not party to a given atrocity
have a moral duty to take any action, legal or illegal, to protect
civilians abroad. Instead it attempts to prompt discussion and
propose conditions under which private citizens who believe
they do have that duty can justifiably claim the right to violate
laws, particularly those regarding state sovereignty, to protect
civilians from atrocities.

Options for Privately Supported Protection
and the Laws They Break
Despite precedent, sizable opportunities for private funding
in support of protection activities have gone untapped. There are
no examples akin to private citizens jamming radio broadcasts,
as could have been done to slow the slaughter in Rwanda in
1994. Little is done to use private resources and organizations
to prepare vulnerable civilians for atrocities before they occur
— e.g., through training and early warning networks. These
activities may be prohibited by many governments, particularly
when they plan on attacking those civilians.
Privately hiring unmanned aerial vehicles to “spy” on or
deter perpetrators, or to warn civilians of incoming danger,
has been considered quietly but never employed. Privatelyemployed intelligence contractors could obtain information on
perpetrators, their plans, their weaknesses, and opportunities to
counter them politically or otherwise. These options are moderate compared to the possibility of privately hiring security contractors to utilize electronic countermeasures (e.g., disrupting
radio communications), or to destroy or disable transportation or
communications equipment. At the extreme, security contractors
willing to violate laws could be hired to use armed force to deter

When is it Necessary to Violate Laws to
Protect Civilians?
This section addresses a number of past cases where lawbreaking was, or is, thought to be necessary to protect civilians
from mass killing. Illegal protective actions are generally treated
25
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Wallenberg (right) saved
110,000 Jews from
Nazi extermination by
creating and issuing false
documents.

perpetrators from attacking civilians or even to actively pursue,
kill, or scatter perpetrating forces. Whatever the current legal
hurdles, might private support for some of these action sometimes be justified when governments fail to protect civilians?
There are two general modalities by which private actors can
support protective activities. In the ideal case, state actors are
already trying to protect civilians through authorized missions
and activities, for example through UN peacekeeping or peace
enforcement missions. In this case, missions may need assistance with training and equipment, which private donors could
help provide if appropriate mechanisms were put in place. This
could be done legally. Where there is not an authorized mission
or that mission is severely hampered — e.g., by the requirement
of acting within the consent of the host government — private
actors must instead consider the option of supporting these
activities through non-governmental agencies, private contractors, and local groups as appropriate.
The types of laws that these actions would break generally
fall into four categories that reflect different levels of potential
harm associated with breaking the law. Thus, they may require
differing levels of justification. Each of these categories is discussed below.

use of manned or unmanned aircraft for observation, early warning, and delivery of aid. Restrictions on freedom of speech also
apply: training individuals in tactics that will help them survive
or providing information regarding violent threats to them may
be viewed by the host government as prohibited discussion of
security or political issues, or as libel against the government.
Altogether, laws in this category are the most evidently “unjust”
when they are clearly used to further a government’s efforts to
kill large numbers of civilians and prevent outside intervention
to protect or care for civilians.

2. Violations of Sovereign Controls in Other
Countries (Non-perpetrators)
Restrictive laws may also be imposed by countries other than
the one where violence is occurring. First, neighboring countries
may prevent access to their borders. For example, technologies
such as unmanned aerial vehicles may be deployed from or
radio transmissions may originate in these countries. Equipment
may also need to be transported through countries, requiring
permission or licenses. Hence, borders may need to be crossed
illegally.
Countries where equipment or finance for these projects
originates may also have applicable laws. Protected technologies, such as night vision goggles, may require export licenses.
Financial sanctions preventing operations in a country may be in
place. Anti-terrorism laws may also apply. In the current form of
the USA Patriot Act and Real I.D. Act, for example, any group
in armed opposition to a government may be considered a terrorist organization, and support for those associated with these
groups — even those who are clearly the victims of terror or
have fought alongside U.S. forces — can be considered material
support to a terrorist organization.13 Finally, “underground railroads” that issue false travel documents, bribing border guards,
or other means of moving people illegally may violate laws of
several countries. At first glance, these laws may not be deeply
unjust as those employed directly by governments perpetrating
atrocities with the intent of harming civilians. They may, however, be equally unjust in consequence.

1. Violations of the Perpetrator’s Sovereign
Controls
By far the most common legal violations caused by protection
activities relate to the sovereignty of the country in question. In
some cases, laws that would be broken while protecting civilians
fall under international conventions — for example, regarding
communications or access to airspace. In the majority of cases,
the laws in question are domestic, however, and are used by
governments to prevent entry of people and supplies that would
provide aid or security to civilians. Domestic measures falling in
this category include strict regulation of visas and travel permits;
licenses to operate as a business or non-profit entity; licenses
to hire workers; licenses to import goods; access to land; and
licenses to own or operate equipment such as vehicles, radios,
and generators. Airspace can also be restricted, preventing the
26

“So long as private citizens have resources to offer for
protection of civilians when states fail to protect them,
we should consider how such citizens can act in a manner
consistent with the supreme importance of the right to
life and the prohibition of genocide, even when doing so
requires breaking laws that otherwise ought to be respected.”
3. Destruction of Property or Interference
in its Use

1.	Conditions: While there has been much debate over which
conditions (conflicts) justify military intervention under
R2P, a nascent consensus may be emerging that R2P applies
to the “worst” cases, specifically, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes.15 The same conditions could be
considered requirements for justification of private actors’
breaking of laws in order to protect civilians.

Destroying or disabling the property of perpetrators may
aim to limit the capability of the perpetrator or impose a cost in
hopes of altering the perpetrator’s actions. The case of Rwanda’s
RTLM radio broadcasts falls in this category: the antenna could
be permanently destroyed, or one could interfere in the equipment’s normal operation by jamming it electronically14 with the
hope that doing so would hamper the Interahamwe’s ability to
continue their genocide.
Beyond interfering with civilian radio broadcasts, this
category involves numerous other possible efforts to protect
civilians. Military equipment such as weapons, vehicles, or
communications gear could be destroyed, sabotaged, jammed,
or even temporarily disabled. Other examples where governments have used or considered these options include proposals
to bomb railroad tracks leading to Nazi-run concentration camps
during World War II, or the use of targeted financial sanctions
against individuals responsible for planning or executing mass
violence.

2.	Precautionary principles: R2P lists four precautionary principles to limit actions that violate sovereignty — right intention; last resort (i.e. peaceful methods have been reasonably
exhausted); proportional means; and reasonable prospects of
success.16 Similar principles could apply to action by private
actors when they believe they must violate laws to protect
civilians. The following may be a useful starting point for
applying these concepts to private actors :
• R
 ight intention: As with military intervention by states,
any illegal protection act undertaken by private citizens
must be done for the right reasons, i.e. with a moral interest in protecting those civilians being targeted.
• L
 ast resort (states first, legal options first): Private
actions violating laws are not yet justifiable when other
realistic options exist, such as (1) waiting for governments to protect civilians or advocating for governments
to do so more effectively; (2) changing the laws that must
be broken or obtaining a waiver to do so; or (3) protecting
civilians just as effectively without breaking any laws. If
reasonable analysis suggests, however, that these options
are unlikely to provide protection in time, then private
actions that break laws may be justified. Applying this
criterion requires considerable judgment, and thus it may
not be sufficiently operationalized. Nevertheless, in cases
where mass killing is occurring at a high rate, and states
are showing reluctance to halt it immediately, there is
a strong argument that states are failing to fulfill their
responsibilities in time, and actions akin to the jamming
of RTLM by private civilians may be justified.

4. Actual, Threatened, or Risked Physical Harm
to Individuals
The most contentious and worrisome, but also perhaps still
justifiable, ways in which laws might be broken include cases
where physical force or the threat of force is used to alter the
capabilities of perpetrators. These may include defensive acts,
such as providing armed deterrence to protect civilian groups
and areas, or offensive attacks, such as intentionally destroying
or scattering the perpetrating force. This category also includes
any action which might unintentionally result in physical harm
to individuals.

When Are Private Actors Justified in
Breaking Laws?
Without the law as ultimate guidance, where can private
actors look for authority and restraint? As a first approximation,
I propose a set of criteria and conditions for illegal action by
private citizens, somewhat similar to R2P’s criteria for military
intervention by states:

• L
 east harmful, most beneficial option: Four categories
were presented for the types of laws that may need to
be broken to protect civilians: those involving sovereign
controls used by the perpetrator to further policies of
27

mass killing; those involving sovereign controls of nonperpetrating states; those that damage or interfere with
property; and those that harm, threaten to harm, or kill
individuals. These categories are ordered by increasing
degree of harm caused or risked by the protective actions.
Therefore, actions should be taken as near to the first
category and as far from the last as possible.

can take too long. The Rwandan genocide lasted only 100
days. It is unlikely that a group of private citizens could have
changed international communications law in time to jam
RTLM transmissions and have a meaningful impact.
	Legitimacy in taking these actions rests then on the integrity
with which the above principles (or other principles for this
purpose) are employed, and the consensus of voices standing
behind them. When possible, illegal protective activities and
the determination of how and why they are justified should
be conducted in a fully transparent manner. Most importantly, the mandate to take on these activities should come
from the populations in harm’s way, through focus groups,
surveys, conferences with civil society, public statements by
civilians in harm’s way, or other means of obtaining a fair
assessment of their wishes and protection needs. We must,
however, acknowledge that obtaining such a mandate in a
meaningful way is difficult both due to the challenges of getting quality information in conflict areas and the possibility
of being misled by vocal minorities, including those with
their own agendas (such as resistance movements).

		Nevertheless, is not an absolute rule: if actions can be
taken that are vastly more effective but come with a
greater actual or potential harm, they may be more justified than a less harmful action with a lesser benefit in
terms of civilians protected. This somewhat resembles
both “proportional means” and “reasonable prospects of
success” under the R2P model in that it turns on an estimate of the consequences.
		The calculation is also similar to an assessment of
whether the law being broken is consequentially “unjust.”
If following a law allows mass killing, whereas violating that law causes little harm but protects civilians, the
law is unjust in consequence. The “least harmful, most
beneficial” criterion further specifies that “more unjust”
laws — those causing the greatest harm for the least benefit — should be broken rather than “less unjust” ones,
which cause less harm or have greater benefits if kept it
in place.

Conclusion
Justifying or advocating actions that break some laws is difficult, and should remain difficult. But the importance of protecting civilians from mass atrocities requires exploring every
option. So long as private citizens have resources to offer for
protection of civilians when states fail to protect them, we
should consider how such citizens can act in a manner consistent
with the supreme importance of the right to life and the prohibition of genocide, even when doing so requires breaking laws that
otherwise ought to be respected.
HRB

3.	Authority: The options examined here are those that remain
when the legal system produces an unjust outcome. One
means of retaining legitimacy while taking these actions
would be to attempt to change these laws. While this may
be wise in the long-run, it is not a reliable strategy because
governments using domestic laws as a shield against interventions do not want to change, and because changing laws
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